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INTRODUCTION 
 Female senior managers are becoming an increasingly widespread phenomenon, 
attracting a significant amount of media attention. For example, according to USA Today 
(2003), the average stock price performance of eight Fortune 500 companies run by 
female Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) significantly exceeded that of the S&P 500 
index in 2003.   
The primary question addressed by this paper is whether the performance of 
female CEOs is different from the performance of their male counterparts. This question 
is motivated by prior research discussed below suggesting that there are substantial “glass 
ceilings” for the promotion of women in corporate America. If so, it is arguable that those 
women who are eventually promoted to the CEO level possess superior skill sets 
compared to an average male CEO, which may translate into a superior performance. In 
addition to the main research question, the current paper also investigates whether female 
CEOs and male CEOs differ in their attitude towards financial risk. This second question 
follows from the findings of prior research documenting differences in risk tolerance 
between males and females (e.g. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1996)). 
Studying a sample of 58 companies run by female CEOs over the 20-year period 
between January, 1985 and December 2004, I find that the stock price returns of the 
companies run by newly appointed female CEOs, are significantly lower then the stock 
price returns of comparable companies run by male CEOs during the year following the 
female CEO appointment. Moreover, this paper doesn’t find evidence of leverage 
differences between the female CEO and male CEO run companies. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews prior research. Section III 
discusses research design, sample selection procedure, variable definitions and sample 
descriptive statistics. Section IV outlines the tests, discusses the results and highlights the 
limitations underlying the study. Section V summarizes research questions and major 
findings. 
I PRIOR RESEARCH 
In developing the first research question, I build on the strand of research 
investigating female status and performance in corporate America. For example, 
Zelechowski and Belemoria (2004), who study the characteristics of female and male 
corporate inside directors in the US, find that women insiders differ significantly from a 
random set of men insiders on several characteristics relevant to their dual positions as 
directors and officers of the corporation. While they do not differ on the experience-based 
qualifications of board tenure or corporate tenure, women insiders hold fewer 
directorships of other corporations, hold less powerful corporate titles, occupy 
disproportionately more staff functions, are less likely to be top earners of the 
corporation, and earn considerably less than men inside directors.  
 Another example, Cobb-Clark (2001) documents that women are less likely to be 
promoted than men, and that had men and women faced the same promotion standards, 
promotion rates would have been higher for women than for men. One way to interpret 
these findings is that there are substantial glass ceilings for female promotion to the 
highest levels of companies. Further, Bertrand and Hallock (2001) study the five highest 
paid executives in a sample of large US firms, and find that women represent only 2.5% 
of the sample and earn 45% less then their male counterparts. As much as 75% of the gap 
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could be explained by under-representation of women in larger companies and in the 
positions of CEO, Chairperson of the board, or President. The authors point out that the 
results of the research don’t rule out the possibility of discrimination via gender 
segregation and unequal promotion. 
This research leads me to my first research question: does the performance of 
female CEOs differ from the performance of male CEOs? 
Related research has also studied financial risk taking by women. Several studies 
such as Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei (1996), and Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner (1996) have 
found that women invest their pensions more conservatively than men. In addition, 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1996) studied the relationship between the percentage of risky 
assets to total assets and several explanatory variables including gender and wealth. Their 
study showed that single women are relatively more risk averse then men or married 
couples. The study also compared the self-reported risk tolerance among different groups 
and revealed that women also perceive themselves as being risk averse. Zinkhan and 
Karande (1991) surveyed MBA students using the Kogan and Wallach (1964) Choice 
Dilemmas Questionnaire as risk-taking behavior measurement tool. They found that 
female MBA students were significantly less likely to take business risks then males. 
This literature leads me to my second research question: do female CEOs have 
different attitude towards financial risk then male CEOs?  
II METHODOLOGY 
II.1 Research Design 
The main research question is whether the performance of companies run by 
female CEOs differs from the performance of companies run by male CEOs. There are 
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several different metrics that can be used to evaluate performance, such as return on 
equity, return on assets, stock performance, etc. I choose to measure company 
performance as abnormal buy-and-hold stock returns around the appointment of a new 
female CEO. To calculate abnormal return, I subtract the raw return from the expected 
return. Finance literature offers numerous ways to compute expected return such as the 
market model, CAPM, three-factor model, four-factor model, etc.  However, given my 
research question and my unique sample, I adjust for the expected return by computing 
the stock returns on a matched pair sample as in Bartov and Mohanran (2004).  
Specifically, each company from the female CEO sample is paired with a male CEO led 
company from the same 2-digit SIC code group. The pairings are then refined by sales 
and market capitalization to form a three-dimensional match based on data at the end of 
the calendar year preceding the respective female CEO nomination. I chose to match by 
both variables simultaneously in order to control for company size and potential under or 
over valuation, measured by the relationship between sales and market capitalization. To 
measure the proximity of two companies based on the above described variables I 
introduced the following variable: 
Z* = (ZSALES (female) – ZSALES (male))^2 + (ZCAP (female) – ZCAP (male))^2,  
where ZSALES and ZCAP are calculated as number of standard deviations from the sample 
average sales and average market capitalization for the respective 2-digit SIC code group 
in the given year.  
The above described matching procedure has an obvious limitation of not 
controlling for the CEO change. Prior academic research suggests that CEO transition 
might have a significant influence on stock price performance around the CEO 
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appointment date. For example, Berman and Lin (2000) demonstrate a negative market 
reaction to the announcements of top executive departures, especially when the CEO is 
dismissed or leaves to take up another job. In addition, a study of listed French 
companies by Dherment-Ferere and Renneboog (2002) finds that the nomination of an 
external manager following a performance related forced resignation of a CEO is 
rewarded by the market by a 2% increase in abnormal return, while promotion of an 
internal CEO in a poorly performing firm is followed by a 1% drop in abnormal return on 
the date of announcement. This research implies that, ideally, the match sample would 
have to consist of male CEO run companies that have experienced a CEO transition on 
the same date as the respective companies in the female CEO sample, in addition to being 
comparable on sales and market capitalization dimensions. Constructing such a matched 
sample, however, would be quite challenging due to data collection and matching 
difficulties, and thus is left for future research.  
The second research question is whether the attitude towards financial risk differs 
between female and male CEOs. I chose financial leverage as a measure of company risk 
since this variable can be promptly changed by the CEO. Financial leverage can be 
defined in several ways using either market value of debt, book value of debt or book 
value of long-term debt in the nominator and either market capitalization, book value of 
equity or book value of assets in the denominator. Since my sample period spans twenty 
years, I use the book value of debt because it is readily available in a machine readable 
form. Since Compustat does not provide a consistent measure of short-term debt, I use 
long-term debt in the nominator of the leverage ratio. I chose book value of assets for the 
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denominator of the leverage ratio since this measure is stable and does not fluctuate 
significantly with stock performance.  
II.2 Sample Selection 
Studying the companies listed on the AMEX, NYSE and Nasdaq exchanges 
allowed the gathering of a sample of 84 female CEOs. The sample data was collected 
from three sources. First, I retrieve the biographies of company officers, which in most 
cases determined a CEO’s gender, from the Hoover’s database. However, Hoover’s only 
provides the biographies of current CEOs. To retrieve the gender of CEOs who no longer 
held their position at the time of the study, I use the Compustat Execucomp database. 
Finally, I study the proxy statements of all sample companies to verify the CEO gender, 
as well as to collect the data on outsider/insider status of newly elected female CEOs. 
While the initial sample consisted of 84 companies, the final sample size is 58 
companies. I lost 26 sample companies due to data limitations. 
Monthly stock returns data were retrieved from CRSP. Accounting and stock 
price data were retrieved from the Compustat. The sample period spans from January, 
1985, to December, 2004. 
II.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The results in Table 1 demonstrate that the matching procedure described above 
has proved efficient. Specifically, the findings indicate that there is little evidence of 
statistically significant differences between the female and male samples on either of the 
matching variables. 
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Table 1. Sample Statistics 
III Results 
III.1 Tests of the First Hypothesis 
To test the first hypothesis of whether the stock returns of female CEO led 
companies are significantly different from the returns of comparable companies led by 
male CEOs, I perform a two-sided Student’s t-test for mean of return differentials as well 
as Wilcoxon test for the median of return differentials between the stock prices of 
companies in female and male samples. To separate the long-run effects of female CEO 
performance from the market reaction on the appointment of a new female CEO I study 
annual as well as monthly return differentials around the CEO appointment date. To 
examine the long-run effect of female CEOs on stock price performance, I study annual 
returns during a six-year period around the female CEO appointment. The results are 
presented in Table 2. 
 
  
 
 
Table 2. The Test of Annual Return Differentials 
The results of both Student’s T-test and Wilcoxon test of annual return 
differentials indicate that the stocks of companies run by newly appointed female CEOs 
Female Sample Male Sample Differentials
Mean Median Mean Median Mean P-value Median P-value
t-3 20.67% 7.80% 14.71% 10.00% 5.96% 0.703 -1.80% 0.799
t-2 19.36% 1.10% 14.42% 5.70% 4.94% 0.811 -6.50% 0.512
t-1 17.73% 4.70% 29.81% 18.80% -12.07% 0.312 -12.00% 0.247
t 1.15% 1.10% 26.70% 21.60% -25.55% 0.010 -21.00% 0.013
t+1 32.22% 16.60% 15.82% 9.10% 16.40% 0.259 6.90% 0.398
t+2 26.20% 20.20% 8.92% 9.00% 17.28% 0.100 11.00% 0.148
Year Relative to the Female 
CEO Appointment Date (t)
Female Sample Male Sample Differentials
Matching Variable Mean Mean Mean P-value
Sales 2276 2474 -197 0.876
Market Capitalization 2226 2048 177 0.899
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under-perform the stocks of comparable companies run by male CEOs by more than 20% 
over a one year period following the appointment of a female CEO. This result is 
statistically significant at 1% significance level. No statistically significant return 
differentials were observed in either second or third year after the female CEO 
appointment. This finding is inconsistent with the implications of prior research 
suggesting that female CEOs might have a more positive influence on company 
performance. 
To study the immediate effect of the announcement of a female CEO appointment 
on the stock price performance, I examine monthly returns in a six-month period around 
the announcement date. The results are presented in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. The Test of Monthly Return Differentials. 
Interestingly, the monthly return differentials during the three months following 
the announcement and the three months before the announcement are not statistically 
significant.  
One potential explanation for this observed pattern in the stock price returns may 
be that newly appointed CEOs engage in earnings manipulations as documented by Wells 
(2002). Using a sample of Australian firms, Wells demonstrated that incoming CEOs 
undertake earnings management using abnormal and extraordinary items to reduce the 
income in the year of CEO change. These activities aim at establishing a low earnings 
base against which the performance of a new CEO will be measured. Downward earnings 
Female Sample Male Sample Differentials
Mean Median Mean Median Mean P-value Median P-value
t-3 8.18% 6.02% 5.91% 5.91% 2.27% 0.462 1.50% 0.554
t-2 8.15% 3.34% 2.85% 1.07% 5.30% 0.169 3.00% 0.280
t-1 -0.48% -1.95% -1.18% -1.74% 0.70% 0.846 -0.25% 0.932
t 3.10% 3.49% 5.12% 3.79% -2.01% 0.553 -1.05% 0.651
t+1 3.74% 1.08% 0.19% 0.34% 3.55% 0.240 2.00% 0.384
t+2 2.53% 1.79% 3.08% 0.46% -0.55% 0.848 -0.55% 0.818
Month Relative to the Female 
CEO Appointment Date (t)
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management in turn can depress company stock price. Therefore, if the newly appointed 
female CEOs as well as their male counterparts engage in earnings manipulations, and 
the write-offs are announced over the course of the year that could potentially result in 
underperformance of the stocks of the respective companies during the year after the new 
CEO appointment. 
III.2 Tests of the Second Hypothesis 
 To test the second hypothesis of whether the leverage of companies led by female 
CEOs is equal to the leverage level of comparable male CEO led companies I run a two-
sided Student’s T test as well as Wilcoxon test for the differences in leverage ratios 
between the female and male samples during a six-year period around the female CEO 
appointment. As Table 4 demonstrates, neither test shows statistically significant 
discrepancy between the two samples. Thus the null hypothesis of leverage equality 
cannot be rejected. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. The Test of Leverage Differentials 
One way to interpret this result is that the attitude towards risk among female 
CEOs is not different from that of male CEOs. The results of the leverage test also have 
implications for the stock performance test. Since leverage after the female CEO 
appointment does not change comparative to male run companies, changes in leverage 
cannot explain the differentials in stock returns in the year following the female CEO 
appointment. 
Female Sample Male Sample Differentials
Mean Median Mean Median Mean P-value Median P-value
t-3 25.70% 15.00% 17.81% 13.10% 7.89% 0.463 -0.50% 0.788
t-2 18.17% 16.40% 18.05% 13.00% 0.12% 0.969 -0.96% 0.576
t-1 15.95% 13.40% 17.06% 12.50% -1.11% 0.681 -0.92% 0.543
t 15.72% 12.10% 16.58% 12.69% -0.86% 0.805 1.07% 0.633
t+1 15.95% 15.80% 17.13% 13.80% -1.18% 0.711 -0.46% 0.851
t+2 14.29% 12.40% 16.88% 14.50% -2.60% 0.341 -1.29% 0.546
Year Relative to the Female 
CEO Appointment Date (t)
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III.3 Limitations of the Study and Future Research 
One limitation of this study is its small sample size. A second limitation concerns 
the matching procedure, which does not control for the effect of a leadership change in 
the female CEO sample. This limitation may be serious since the prior research suggests 
that such factors as voluntary versus forced resignation and insider versus outsider 
succession are significant explanatory factors of stock price performance.  
Recognizing the limitations of this research, I suggest several directions for future 
research. To separate the pure effect of CEO gender, the control sample could be 
constructed of companies that experienced a CEO transition during the same time period. 
Another approach could be to introduce additional explanatory variables suggested by 
prior research, such as the reason for the incumbent CEO departure and the successor 
CEO origin. However, given the relatively small sample size, explanatory power of those 
variables is not expected to be significant.   
 Still, to assess the possibility of incorporating additional variables into my 
current research design I run a regression of stock price return differentials on the 
successor CEO origin. I chose successor CEO origin as the explanatory variable since 
this variable is the most directly observable. The origin of a new female CEO was 
measured by a dummy variable Outsider, which is given a value of 1 if the successor 
CEO is an outsider and a value of 0 if the successor CEO is an insider. Out of 58 
companies in the sample only 13 incoming CEOs were outsiders. I use the annual returns 
one year after the female CEO appointment since only during this period the return 
differentials are statistically significant. The regression produced the following equation: 
Return Differential = -0.243 – 0.057 Outsider. This result is not statistically significant 
since the p-value of the Outsider variable is 0.808 with R2 of 0%. 
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Another approach to separate the effect of CEO gender is to add a random sample 
of companies run by newly appointed male CEOs matched with comparable companies 
run by continuing male CEOs to the current sample. After that the differentials between 
the stock price returns of sample companies run by newly appointed CEOs and sample 
companies run by continuing CEOs can be regressed on the successor CEO gender along 
with new CEO origin and the reason for the departure of the previous CEO. 
IV Summary 
This paper investigates whether there are gender related differences with respect 
to the CEO’s contribution to company performance and the choice of leverage. Based on 
prior research showing that women are discriminated when it comes to promotion to 
higher management positions, I hypothesize that women who ultimately reach the 
position of CEO possess superior skills relative to their male counterparts. Therefore, I 
predict superior performance from female CEO led companies. Another strand of 
research shows that women are more risk averse when financial decisions are concerned. 
To test the relevance of this phenomenon for women in CEO position this paper studies 
the differences in leverage between female CEO and male CEO led companies. 
This study demonstrates that female CEO run companies significantly under-
perform male CEO run companies in the year following the female CEO appointment. 
Starting from the second year after the female CEO appointment no statistically 
significant differences in stock price performance between female CEO and male CEO 
run companies was observed. However, this result is inconclusive since the 
underperformance can also result from other factors, such as the mere CEO succession 
itself or earnings management, which were not controlled for. This study also does not 
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find any statistically significant difference between the leverage levels of female CEO 
and male CEO run companies. 
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Appendix 
 
 Study Samples 
 
Female CEO Sample Male CEO Sample
Company Name SIC Code Sales Market Cap Company Name SIC Code Sales Market Cap
E.piphany Inc 7372 96.13 538.75 Interwoven Inc 7372 111.51 516.90
Allied Healthcare International 8082 294.38 139.03 Radiologix Inc 8093 257.01 73.72
Sonesta International Hotels 7011 90.13 17.00 Arlington Hospitality Inc 7011 76.53 17.17
The Boyds Collection 3942 131.34 393.09 Wms Industries Inc 3990 174.69 478.97
Alaska Communications Systems Group 4813 343.50 56.57 Talk America Holdings Inc 4813 317.51 153.83
Bitstream Inc 7372 8.47 14.03 Plm Equip Growth Fd V  -Lp 7359 9.28 11.87
Tower Automotive 3460 2,754.46 252.23 Silgan Holdings Inc 3411 1,988.28 449.94
Global Epoint 3571 0.18 5.34 Silicom Limited 3576 2.73 1.23
Rite Aid Corporation 5912 15,800.92 1,262.03 Toys R Us Inc 5945 11,305.00 2,125.00
Advent Software 7372 159.44 447.79 Open Text Corp 7372 152.48 456.15
Russ Berrie & Co Inc 3942 321.36 693.33 Yankee Candle Inc 3990 444.84 869.74
Cyberoptics Corp 3827 24.63 39.00 Mocon Inc 3829 19.93 38.78
The Phoenix Companies 6311 2,452.90 714.74 Landamerica Financial Gp 6361 2,586.55 650.47
Claire's Stores 5600 918.74 734.92 Pacific Sunwear Calif Inc 5651 684.84 669.18
Banta Corporation 2750 1,457.94 730.03 Standard Register Co 2761 1,187.64 514.26
Pathmark Stores 5411 3,963.30 741.13 Pao De Acucar Brasil  -Gdr 5411 3,515.39 1,090.98
Rubio's Restaurants 5812 112.94 29.09 Elxsi Corp 5812 105.40 30.69
Zale Corp 5944 2,068.24 1,458.05 Insight Enterprises Inc 5961 2,082.34 1,031.31
Salix Pharmaceuticals 2834 22.35 338.36 Novavax Inc 2836 24.07 328.46
Ihop Corp 6794 324.44 606.83 Colonial Properties Trust 6798 318.68 653.43
Axcelis Technologies 3559 365.26 1,255.16 Cirrus Logic Inc 3576 417.53 1,096.98
Edgewater Technology 7370 26.57 45.80 Mitcham Industries Inc 7359 27.18 39.82
Lucent Technologies 7370 21,294.00 21,509.25 Electronic Data Systems Corp 7370 21,543.00 32,719.94
Qrs Corp 7372 143.49 187.87 Pegasus Solutions Inc 7370 161.53 170.86
Argonaut Technologies 2835 17.45 155.30 Columbia Laboratories Inc 2834 13.17 131.51
Xerox Corporation 3577 18,701.00 3,092.16 Sanyo Electric Co Ltd  -Adr 3579 18,072.56 15,672.14
Cns Inc 3842 68.89 50.29 Candela Corp 3845 75.39 58.91
Immunomedics 2835 4.78 1,060.57 Cerus Corp 2836 1.85 1,057.41
Visx Incorporated 3845 200.25 634.14 Cooper Companies Inc 3851 197.32 576.59
Gymboree Corp 2300 448.61 389.06 Oshkosh B'Gosh Inc  -Cl A 2300 453.06 225.18
Lee Enterprices Inc 2711 422.14 1,306.09 Journal Register Co 2711 463.97 720.47
Carver Bancorp 6035 30.86 20.25 Independence Fed Svgs Bk 6035 25.99 16.97
Chester Valley Bancorp 6020 34.58 61.30 Sterling Bancorp/Ny 6020 97.73 133.84
Agl Resources 4924 1,068.60 970.70 Equitable Resources Inc 4923 1,062.74 1,092.36
Hot Topic Inc 5600 168.95 224.62 Christopher & Banks Corp 5621 143.40 141.73
Coachmen Industries Inc 3716 606.47 487.68 Orbital Sciences Corp 3760 461.44 554.78
Aspect Communications Corp 3661 489.11 1,935.20 Adtran Inc 3661 367.21 1,976.18
Alpharma Inc  -CL A 2834 732.44 910.60 Church & Dwight Inc 2840 730.04 1,036.97
Columbia Banking System 6020 94.50 139.16 Sterling Bancorp/Ny 6020 97.73 133.84
Ventas Inc 6798 149.93 826.91 Choice Hotels Intl Inc 6794 165.38 776.45
Avon Products 2844 5,212.70 11,616.55 Air Products & Chemicals Inc 2810 4,919.00 8,458.80
Zale Corp 5944 1,427.01 1,173.90 Systemax Inc 5961 1,435.65 844.49
Hewlett-Packard Co 3570 47,061.00 69,364.72 Nec Corp  -Adr 3571 40,334.00 14,724.44
Tennant Company 3580 389.39 366.50 Kulicke & Soffa Industries 3559 411.04 414.76
Johnson Outdoors 3690 328.53 74.87 Lamson & Sessions Co 3640 270.91 68.91
Cascade Bancorp 6020 23.15 116.82 Riverview Bancorp Inc 6035 22.78 103.11
Syms Corp 5651 352.96 211.96 Amern Eagle Outfitters Inc 5651 405.71 349.01
Vermont Teddy Bear 3942 17.04 12.26 Womens Golf Unlimited Inc 3949 8.56 2.07
Firstfed Financial Corp 6035 308.09 231.64 Webster Financial Corp 6035 291.06 291.28
Department 56 Inc 3260 252.05 826.83 Waterford Wedgwood Plc  -Adr 3260 551.20 667.84
Siebert Financial Corp 6211 21.04 8.02 Crown Financial Group Inc 6211 24.95 9.97
Avant Immuterapeutics 2835 3.96 62.13 Interferon Sciences 2836 3.31 46.84
Charming Shoppes 5621 1,272.69 681.67 Burlington Coat Factory Wrhs 5651 1,468.44 483.25
Theragenics Corp 2834 4.38 58.21 Interferon Sciences 2836 3.31 46.84
Autodesk Inc 7372 237.85 1,238.91 Cadence Design Systems Inc 7372 392.26 1,060.17
Playboy Enterprices 4841 161.77 118.75 Clear Channel Communications 4832 32.46 39.78
Pinnacle Systems 3577 331.08 540.70 Ionics Inc 3559 347.41 570.05
Books-a-Million 5940 460.16 106.30 Chronimed Inc 5912 435.71 106.35  
